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Abstract 
It has been argued that Scotland faces population ageing and decline that will have 
potentially serious economic and social consequences, and that the origin of these 
process lie in its low and declining fertility rates. This paper argues that low fertility is 
not the problem it is purported to be, and that pro-natalism is both undesirable and 
unnecessary. It suggests that low fertility and population ageing are positive 
developments, and that what is distinctive about Scotland is not any shortage of births 
but an excess of early deaths. 
 
‘Low’ Fertility and Population Replacement in Scotland. 
 
‘The future never resembles the past’ (Keynes 1937:13) 
 
1 Introduction 
Perhaps because of its surprisingly intimate relationship with state power and 
international relations, the study of fertility has been more prone than most to alarums 
and excursions. In a recent article on population projections, Wilson and Rees (2003) 
argue that Scotland’s ‘most pressing demographic problem’ is ‘a rapidly ageing 
population due to a low and declining fertility rate… Scotland’s population will fail to 
become demographically sustainable unless current low fertility rises. The severity of 
the consequences of the current demographic trajectory on which Scotland is traveling 
do not seem to be fully appreciated in the UK demographic literature and in public 
debate.’ Since only fertility, rather than migration, will affect the future age-structure, 
‘A large-scale pro-natalist initiative in Scotland should be given very serious 
consideration’ in order to avoid serious consequences for the Scottish economy ‘what 
Scotland really needs is a pro-natalist policy’. Their analysis is similar to that of 
Graham and Boyle (2003) and part of a much wider trend in the contemporary 
analysis of European population trends that identifies population ageing and decline 
as impending problems and low fertility as the culprit (see, e.g. Castles 2003, 
Chesnais 1998, Goldstein et al 2003, Grant et al 2004, Lesthaeghe 2001, Lutz et al 
2003, Neyer 2003, Sleebos 2003). This article argues that this increasingly noisy 
consensus, very audible in the debate over pensions reform for example, is mistaken. 
As Graham and Boyle (2003) note, there has been little research specifically on 
Scotland, so that in what follows I also refer to relevant material from a UK and 
European context.  
 
Contemporary demography is a good example of the difficulty social science often 
has, paradoxically, in digesting the implications of its own analyses of social change. 
Trapped in the mentality of the past it addresses yesterday’s issues. In demography 
this reveals itself in two rather anachronistic assumptions: (1) that the maintenance (if 
not growth) of existing population levels is desirable and (2) that ‘below-replacement’ 
levels of fertility must be caused by some ‘blockage’, whether social, economic or 
psychological, that prevents those who would really prefer to have more children 
realizing their desires. These assumptions reach across the political spectrum; from 
those who blame the atrophy of traditional morality and the family (Fukuyama 1999), 
to those who see the further collectivization of the costs of parenting as the solution 
(McDonald 2005). These two assumptions are also conservative. Like those that 
associate de-industrialisation, or a fall in the proportion of the workforce in 
agriculture with economic ‘decline’, they fail to realize that society has passed the 
historical stage where the struggle for population is a vital (MacInnes & Pérez 2005). 
 
This article suggests that analyses of low fertility pay insufficient attention both to 
empirical history (we have been here, or somewhere like it, before) and to 
demographic theory. Population reproduction is about more than fertility (Henry 
1965). The social determinants and consequences of fertility have changed and, unlike 
persons, populations never have and do not now ‘age’ (Peréz 2004). In the 1930s, as 
the effects of what came to be known as the demographic transition became clearer, 
there was much discussion of low fertility rates, not only because they were imagined 
to presage population decline, but because low fertility disproportionately affected the 
‘better classes’ and thus the quality of countries ‘racial stock’ (Teitelbaum and Winter 
1985). Such fears motivated rather impressive social scientific advances in such areas 
as statistics and data collection through censuses and surveys (Szreter 1984, Soloway 
1990). Ironically, most of this research was driven by eugenic and racist ideas about 
the inheritance of innate ability and the racial character of populations that only fell 
into disgrace when the full horror of the Holocaust became apparent. With hindsight it 
can be clearly seen that the conclusions drawn from this research owed more to the 
anxieties of its authors, persuaded of the perils or evils of low fertility, than 
dispassionate consideration of the data.  
 
Insofar as this research attempted demographic predictions it was usually wildly 
wrong. For example Warren Thompson, a key early theorist of the demographic 
transition, forecast that the population of Europe had probably reached its peak and 
was set to decline (Thompson 1929). It has since trebled. Contraception and ‘family 
limitation’ were held responsible for all manner of moral and medical decay and 
decline of patriotic responsibility. Such arguments may nowadays be confined to the 
wilder shores of some nevertheless powerful religious institutions (the beliefs and 
behaviour of believers is another matter) but their intellectual descendents are to be 
found in the increasingly popular idea that a collective interest in population 
replacement, the future fiscal sustainability of the state and manageable ratios 
between those of working age and the ‘dependent’ old require the state to encourage 
higher fertility through the further socialization of the costs of rearing children. Just as 
eugenic ideas found support across the political spectrum, so today does the idea that 
sustaining fertility is a social good.  
 
This article suggests that it is far too early to conclude that either Scotland, or Europe, 
faces substantial population decline. Actual population decline started in Scotland a 
generation ago, with relatively little comment or concern. Should such decline 
continue it is not obviously bad. What is popularly called ‘population ageing’, with its 
attendant imagery of social sclerosis and decay, concerns changes in the age structure 
of the population that have been underway for a century. Such changes neither 
automatically worsen dependency ratios nor threaten the economy. If Scotland has a 
‘pressing demographic problem’ that distinguishes it from either the rest of the UK or 
Europe it is not low fertility but high mortality - Scotland needs more ‘population 
ageing’ not less. I shall conclude that Scotland does not needs no pro-natalist policy, 
which is just as well, since the evidence shows them to be Canute like in their 
effectiveness. They are solutions that will not work to a problem that does not exist. 
 
2 Empirical evidence about current fertility rates and plans in Scotland 
Table 1 shows births in Scotland in since 1946. The total period fertility rate (TFR) 
for Scotland in 2004 was 1.60 (its lowest ever level was 1.48, in 2002). The 
experience of Scotland, where the TFR has halved from its peak in 1964, is similar to 
other European countries. There are two factors behind this development. The first is 
the long term ‘demographic transition’ to lower fertility and mortality rates which has 
accompanied economic development and the rise of ‘modern’ society. No 
industrialized country (including the US) has a TFR above replacement level 
(conventionally taken as 2.1) and the estimated TFR for the entire developing world 
declined to 3.1 in 2002. The second is the aftermath of the post-War ‘baby boom’ 
during which most Western countries experienced levels of nuptiality, low age at first 
birth and low voluntary infertility that were unprecedented and unlikely ever to return. 
The drift to lower fertility rates thus resumes a longer trend first visible in the 1930s 
and subject to much comment at the time.  
 
Scotland might stand out from other countries if fertility decline continued at its pre-
2002 rate while rates stabilized elsewhere (see Figure 1), but given the unpredictable 
character of short term fluctuations in TFR, visible in Figure 1, there is no evidence 
yet of any such distinction emerging. To assume that a continued or accelerated 
decline in rates will occur (e.g. Wilson and Rees 2003) seems unwarranted, as does 
Graham and Boyle’s classification of Scotland as a country with ‘very low fertility’ 
on the strength of its TFR dipping below 1.5 for a single year. The Scottish TFR 
remains well above the EU average, it is substantially higher than rates experienced 
by the ‘lowest low’ fertility countries of Spain, Italy, Germany and Greece, but below 
rates enjoyed by the Scandinavian countries and France.  
 
All measures of fertility have advantages and disadvantages. TFR is rather sensitive to 
changes in the timing of childbirth across the life course since it is a transversal 
measure of longitudinal behaviour (Boongarts & Feeney 1998). Since an important 
contemporary change is rise in age at first birth (sometimes referred to as 
‘postponement’) combined with increasing fertility at later ages (sometimes referred 
to as ‘recuperation’) TFR overestimates fertility falls by failing to ‘measure’ 
recuperation – since such recuperation may or may not take place. Conversely, as 
‘recuperation’ kicks in, the TFR may rise faster than the underlying increase in 
fertility: a plausible interpretation of Scotland’s TFR performance in 2003 and 2004.  
An alternative, more accurate, measure is the completed fertility rate (CFR). This has 
the substantial drawback that it can only be calculated on a retrospective basis once a 
cohort of women has reached the end of their fertile period (conventionally 45 years). 
Figure 2 shows this measure to be much less volatile than the TFR. It peaked at 2.63 
in 1978 (compared to a peak of 3.09 for TFR in 1964) and currently stands at 1.90. 
CFR for the EU was 1.70 for the female cohort born in 1963. In this sense Scotland 
has relatively high fertility.  
 
These falls in realized fertility have been accompanied by much smaller falls in 
‘desired’ family size (Goldstein et al 2003), which continues to be around two in 
Europe, so that Chesnais (1998) argues that this gap represents a ‘latent demand for 
family support’ comparable to that which earlier existed for reliable contraception. To 
my knowledge there is no data on ‘ideal’ number of children available for Scotland, 
however the quality of such survey data is, to say the least, debatable. Most people are 
rather vague about their fertility intentions (Hobcraft 2004, Irwin 2000) and there is 
little evidence of any robust link between intention and result over any but the very 
short term (MacInnes 2004). Potential parents are usually asked how many children 
they would prefer to have. To take this as a measure of the actual ‘demand’ for 
children is rather like asking respondents how much they would like to earn, what size 
of house they would prefer, or what make of car they would like to drive.  People 
reveal their preferences in their behaviour: choosing, within the constraints that face 
them, between devoting time and resources to study, leisure, employment, domestic 
tasks and inter alia, having children. The General Household Survey does ask women 
under fifty about their fertility history and asks whether ‘you think that you will have 
any (more) children’ and ‘[h]ow many children do you think you will have born to 
you in all including those you already have had already.’ This question wording has 
the considerable merit of pointing respondents towards practical results rather than 
ideal preferences, but detailed analysis of results from England and Wales suggest that 
it still leads respondents to over-estimate their eventual fertility (Smallwood and 
Jeffries 2003) and Simons (1978) argues that respondents still answer such question 
wording with reference to norms about acceptable family sizes rather than their own 
preferences and situation. Using this measure, women under 50 in Scotland in 2003/4 
who gave definite answers to the question (i.e. excluding don’t know’s) estimated 
their eventual completed fertility at just under 1.91. 
 
3 Possible Causes of long term low fertility 
As Wilson and Rees note, there is no consensus about the likely future trend of 
fertility rates in advanced industrial societies, nor agreement about the causes of their 
decline or what variables might best explain temporal or spatial variation; although 
no-one expects any general return to ‘replacement’ levels of fertility in the foreseeable 
future (;Caldwell 1982; Coale 1986; Van de Kaa 1987; Mason 1997; Chesnais 1998; 
Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; Frejka and Calot 2001; Frejka and Ross 2001; 
Lesthaeghe 2001; McDonald 2001; Caldwell and Shindlmayr 2003; Demeny 2003). 
Research has begun relatively recently; data sources that link demographic behaviour 
to social or economic status or social attitudes are sparse, and aggravated by the need 
to concentrate analysis on comparatively brief periods in the life course of men and 
women, so that conventional survey samples often prove too small for accurate 
analysis. The limited number of ‘cases’ (countries) makes comparative macro analysis 
an imprecise tool as well as a theoretical minefield. It is easy to mis-use transversal 
comparisons across countries at a given point in time to produce over-optimistic 
conclusions about the future course of fertility within countries over time. Thus 
analyses that use such cross country comparisons to reveal a ‘reversal’ in the 
relationship between women’s employment and fertility over recent years (e.g. 
Castles 2003) confuse social change with a compositional effect caused by the later 
fall in fertility in Southern European countries with lower female participation rates. 
Finally some issues (such as the evolution of desired and completed family size over 
time) require longitudinal research that yields results only in the future, or is forced to 
rely on respondent recall with its associated biases. However there are five factors that 
shape contemporary discussion. 
 
3.1 Timing 
Part of the fertility fall is associated with childbirth timing: the rise in age at first birth. 
This is associated in turn with higher age at partnership formation, although the 
increase in cohabitation and associated changes in forms of partnership make this 
more difficult to measure. Timing is often discussed in terms of ‘postponement’, but 
this rather misleadingly implies a former ‘normal’ age for first births. A second 
element is the decline of higher parities (i.e. large families) in part because of fall in 
the time period between first birth and age-based decline in fertility for women. 
Timing is related to changes in gender relations, the labour market and ‘marriage 
market’:  
    
(1) An increase in alternatives to motherhood for women, (more equal opportunities in 
education and employment). 
(2) A slower change in the amount of men’s involvement in unpaid domestic labour 
including childcare. 
(3) A perception of increasing absolute and relative costs of children (see below). 
(4) Trend rises in skill and qualification levels in employment with associated rises in 
education and training times and time spent ‘establishing’ a career. 
(5) Increase in the age of emancipation of young people from the parental home. 
 
Actual or potential parents (in the sense of people with some desire for children) may 
require longer periods than in the past to establish the (rising) standard of living 
thought necessary to form a family. They may also be more demanding about their 
choice of partner. However the definition of such ‘economic conditions’ is highly 
variable, and may well be inversely related to potential parents’ affluence, i.e. those 
with low incomes or other dimensions of economic insecurity may nevertheless have 
higher fertility rates. Research on voluntary childlessness based on Eurobarometer and 
FFS surveys (MacInnes 2004) suggests that a relatively small proportion of those 
without children consciously planned to have none from an early age. More important 
is ‘postponement’: the decision not to have a child in the immediate future which 
gradually, and not necessarily accompanied by any explicit recognition, becomes the 
postponement of childbearing beyond the end of a respondent’s fertile years. Such 
research also suggests that ‘work-life balance’ or other economic issues (income, 
housing) rarely feature in respondents’ accounts of voluntary childlessness or 
restriction of family size. More important is civil status (though this tells us nothing 
about the direction of cause and effect) and problems in a partnership. This directly 
contradicts other social attitude survey evidence, however, in which respondents 
overwhelmingly attribute falls in family size in general (as opposed to their own 
personal experience) to ‘economic reasons’.  Timing raises the relevance of public 
knowledge of the relationship between women’s age and fertility. While public 
knowledge of contraception may be good, knowledge about the rate at which 
women’s fertility declines with age may be less developed so that postponement may 
sometimes inadvertently become involuntary childlessness (Toulemon 1996).  
 
3.2 Changes in Gender Relations 
To the extent that women have increased alternatives to motherhood we might expect 
fertility to decline. In addition values of gender equality are intimately linked to those 
of individual self realization (Giddens 1991, 1992) that might both reduce the desire 
for children and increase their perceived costs, insofar as they are now seen as 
individuals who must be endowed with the capacity to direct their own self refelxive 
life-projects in the future. In the longer term this might be seen as part of the move 
away from patriarchal societies with strong household economies in which the 
benefits of fertility largely accrued to men while the costs were born by women. Rises 
in separation and divorce rates, since they increase the risk of family breakdown, may 
depress fertility rates. Only longitudinal evidence can identify the linkages between 
marriage, cohabitation and fertility, since the shift between these statuses often 
anticipates fertility decisions, or results from them, rather than simply being 
antecedent causal factors. It may be relevant that the countries in Europe with the 
lowest low fertility rates all have strong institutional patriarchal traditions, and 
McDonald, amongst others has suggested that these now act as a break on fertility. 
However, drawing such a conclusion depends upon making the conceptual leap from 
transversal evidence to longitudinal conclusions that we criticized above. 
 3.3 The costs of children 
Opinion poll evidence shows that when asked in general terms (as opposed to their 
own behaviour), overwhelming majorities of respondents cite the increasing cost of 
children as the main reason for falling fertility. Most demographic literature agrees 
with the qualification that increasing opportunity costs are emphasised, particularly 
for mothers with labour market careers, rather than direct costs. It is frequently argued 
(e.g. Becker 1991) that any savings flowing from the reduced number of children has 
been offset by an increase in their ‘quality’: more per capita time and money 
investment has increased the cost of children. Work-life balance studies have 
suggested that it is more difficult to coordinate parenting with employment in an 
increasingly mobile society, and some studies have suggested that parents devote 
increasing amounts of time to children. This evidence of the increasing cost of 
children is put alongside evidence of unfulfilled or latent demand for children to 
conclude that low fertility is a function of the increasing cost of children, so that 
greater state support and re-distribution of these costs could raise fertility. 
 
Such arguments are not new. Alva Myrdal (1968 [1939]) put the case eloquently and 
comprehensively sixty years ago, and her arguments formed the basis of the 
Scandinavian model of the welfare state. Unlike many of her contemporaries she 
realized that gender inequality was unsustainable in the long run in the labour market, 
and therefore also in parenting. Changes in the nature of employment, the family and 
the state were therefore needed. The second thing to note is that it is unlikely that the 
direct costs of having a child have risen in real terms over the course of the twentieth 
century. States have absorbed a rising proportion of the costs of children through tax 
breaks, child benefits, subsidized maternal or parental leave or other income transfers, 
and the provision of services, such as nurseries, education and health care.  
Technological innovation has cheapened almost all the goods consumed in the course 
of parenting, reduced the amount of time input necessary (e.g. disposable nappies, 
prepared foods, automatic washing machines) and created new technological 
possibilities (the early morning video; baby alarms).  
 
Childcare supervision is a highly unusual but important example of a ‘technologically 
non progressive activity’ (Baumol 1967). Its relative (but not absolute) cost therefore 
rises in proportion to the general level of technological innovation. Furthermore, 
almost uniquely in modern society, it is a status-specific physically non-alienable 
activity. That is the identity of the person doing it is paramount (a child would suffer 
if it did not know, from one day to the next who was caring for it, regardless of the 
level of competency and expertise of the carer) and their physical presence is 
important. While this explains the very severe limits to any ‘industrialisation of the 
family’, it is also important because of its links to the economics of time (Becker 
1965, Linder 1970). As the cost of time increases with the general economic 
prosperity, the opportunity cost of parental childcare increases, as well as itself 
becoming more ‘cumbersome’ (Myrdal 1968 [1939]) in a social and economic context 
that prioritises flexibility and mobility.  
 
However, any such rise in children’s opportunity cost, principally due to the rising 
value of time in a society with a widening range of productive and consumption 
activities, is simply part of the general rise in the opportunity cost of any time 
consuming activity that occurs as the result of such economic progress (Becker 1965, 
Linder 1970). It cannot, of its own, explain any general decline in fertility, since the 
opportunity cost of other activities, in terms of children ‘foregone’ in order to 
undertake them, must also have risen. What rising opportunity costs tell us is that 
potential parents in affluent societies have other priorities than devoting large amounts 
of their increasing resources and higher living standards to producing more children. 
Given that children are usually seen as an end in themselves, and human life is not 
seen as something that ought routinely to be accounted for in monetary terms, it is 
socially more acceptable to represent such choices between alternative opportunities 
as ‘the rising cost of children’.  
 
3.4 Changes in social attitudes and values 
Changes in social attitudes are argued to have undermined the ‘traditional’ family, and 
some of its elements such as marriage or the authority of the husband. It may also be 
the case that an increasing conscious of risk and social change predispose individuals 
against long term (e.g. marriage) or irreversible (e.g. parenthood) commitments. 
However any such transformation of intimacy (Giddens 1992) or increase in 
individualization or move to ‘post-materialist values’ (Van de Kaa 1997, Inglehart 
1997) is occurring against high and rising levels of support in principle for the family 
as an institution, the importance of partnership and desirability of children, at least as 
measured by social attitude survey data. Although substantial attention has been paid 
to values, it is equally plausible to regard them as the result of demographic change, 
rather than its cause. 
 
3.5 Work-life balance, the reconciliation of work and family life and family 
friendliness. 
Policy and research attention has been paid to ‘work–life balance’ policies for obvious 
reasons, but any robust connection between the latter and fertility rates (as opposed to 
female employment rates) has proved elusive (OECD 2001, Sleebos 2003). Within 
Britain, there is a relation, although not strong, between presence of children, time 
stress and subjective perception of work-life imbalance. But there is also no relation 
between presence of children and demand for reduced working hours. Respondents 
give a rather positive evaluation of employers’ sensitivity to childcare commitments 
(possibly due to rather low expectations) and the results cast doubt on any ability to 
characterize respondents as primarily committed to employment or to the family 
(MacInnes, 2005).  
 
A key, but largely unnoticed development, is that in Britain, as in other countries, the 
employment rate for mothers has increased more slowly than the decrease in the 
percentage of women of working age who are mothers (what might be thought of as 
the parenting rate of workers) so that the proportion of the workforce who are mothers 
of dependent children has fallen slightly, while the proportion of the male workforce 
who are fathers of dependent children has fallen from around one half to one third 
over the last thirty years. The bargaining weight of parents within the workforce may 
therefore have declined. Demand for work–life balance policies may come from older 
workers, with less outgoings and family commitments, who prefer to substitute 
income for leisure.  
 
4 Do children cost more?  
If we review these elements of the debate, a common theme emerges that 
demographers, economists and sociologists have perhaps been slow to grasp. Most 
potential parents, especially mothers, now face a much greater range of life 
opportunities, and have the educational and other resources to pursue them, while they 
also enjoy far greater freedom in their reproductive and non-reproductive sexual 
behaviour. Can we seriously suppose that a family in a welfare state, with universal 
education, a public health system, a commitment to various forms of employment 
protection for women who become pregnant and for others, and a standard of living 
that equips most households with a wide range of time-saving consumer durables, 
faces greater difficulties in realizing a desire to have children than, say, its nineteenth 
or eighteenth century equivalent, let alone its predecessors of the ‘baby boom’ years? 
For example, in the Britain of the early 1950s, when the boom commenced, fewer 
than a half of all households had a washing machine, an electric cooker, a fridge, or 
electric water heater.   
 
Merely to pose the question in these terms is to realize how profound the change in 
the social relations of fertility has been. Today, in Europe, having a child is a matter 
of private, largely un-coerced choice, albeit one that brings with it (like most ‘free’ 
decisions) a range of costs and risks, some of which are more foreseeable than others. 
It is easy to forget how recent the historical shift has been, not only to the ability to 
personally plan fertility reliably and cheaply, but to the idea that it is something than 
might be personally planned at all. Until well into the last century church, state, 
patriarchal interest and social norms encouraged women to ‘be fruitful and multiply’ 
and sexual behaviour was subject to strict legal sanction that is only now 
disappearing.  However, though they sometimes might wish to try, neither church nor 
state can easily re-enter the bedroom once it has been defined as a private rather than 
public space.  
 
5 Is fertility management possible in a democratic society? 
Even if we assumed, for the sake of argument, that higher fertility rates were 
desirable, we would still have to show that they could be achieved. There is little 
robust evidence of pro-natalist policies successfully raising fertility rates, and plenty 
examples of failure, or contradictory policy instruments. For example at the same time 
as Franco’s Spain sought to boost fertility by restricting mother’s employment, 
Mussolini’s Italy pursued the same aim by promoting it. The Scandinavian or French 
states might be taken as an example of the ability to sustain fertility rates over the 
longer term. However, any attempt to identify a causal link between state policy and 
fertility change faces a mass of prior and intervening variables to contend with. We 
might plausibly expect measures such as substantial state expenditure on public pre-
school childcare, public education and health systems, regulation and subsidy for 
maternity and parental leaves at replacement earnings, benefits or tax breaks for those 
with children to alter the relative cost of children and thus promote fertility. If such a 
clear link existed, we would surely have found it long ago. Consider the cases of 
Portugal or the USA. Neither country offers much support to parents. Consider too 
France and Sweden: countries with very different social policies but which have 
nevertheless been inspired by a desire to sustain fertility. Figure 3 shows that it is far 
from clear that the fertility ‘performance’ of Sweden and France has been superior to 
Portugal and the USA. There is also controversy over the extent to which such state 
involvement may prove self-defeating in the very long term. Some commentators 
relate the recent volatility in Swedish fertility rates (visible in Figure 1) to their 
increased sensitivity to changes in state support.  
 
Consider next those countries, aside from France, that McDonald (2005) claims to 
have had some success in raising fertility: Hungary (in the 1960s), and the German 
Democratic Republic (1970s). Presumably modestly forbade mention of Rumania. 
Facing a TFR of 1.80 in 1966, government measures achieved no less than double that 
rate one year later (according to official statistics). Fertility then declined steadily till 
the mid 1980s at which point another pro-natalist initiative was introduced which 
proved ineffective. How was such change possible? Until the 1960s abortion was in 
practice, a widely used method of contraception. It was banned without warning in 
November 1966. Access was restricted to other forms of contraception and to divorce. 
Tax, maternity, housing and retirement benefits were offered for those having 
children. In the ensuing chaos, infant and maternal mortality rose, in part because the 
sudden baby boom had as one of its (predictable) results a large increase in the 
proportion of obstetricians on maternity leave. The 1984 pro-natalist initiative, which 
bore little fruit, once again restricted abortion while publicity campaigns promoted 
having children as ‘a high honour and a patriotic duty’ (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985, 
100-102).  
 
One conclusion that might be drawn from all this is that natalist policies ultimately 
depend on two approaches. One is direct state control of reproductive behaviour. 
There is little doubt that this is effective. One only has to look at the world prior to the 
demographic transition, and the near universal patriarchal control of sexual behaviour 
by church and state to see that this could indeed deliver high fertility at the 
considerable price of the tight regulation of women’s (and to a lesser extent men’s) 
behaviour. This is not a world we should aspire to re-create. The other approach is to 
modify the resource context in which people make decisions about children so as to 
make more and earlier births a more attractive option for potential parents. The 
success of this approach in turn depends upon the existence of significant blocks to 
higher fertility in the form of time or resource constraints. It is not surprising 
therefore, that a wealth of social demographic literature and enquiry has proceeded on 
the popular assumption that the relative direct or opportunity costs of children have 
risen in contemporary Europe. Were this the case, we might expect government 
intervention to further socialize the costs of parenting to be costly but ultimately 
effective.  
 
However, an alternative, and perhaps more plausible explanation is that fertility 
decline represents less the increasing cost of children than a declining ‘demand’ for 
them.  In contemporary society fertility can and does fall, because people can now 
afford not to have children, while far fewer children are actually necessary to 
reproduce population. They have other priorities for themselves, as well as higher 
aspirations for those children that they do decide to have. This liberation from the 
heavy burden and (for women) risky nature of reproductive labour was a fundamental 
and revolutionary achievement of the twentieth century for much of the world, based 
on unprecedented falls in mortality (Pérez Diaz 2004). We should not let assumptions 
about fertility rates forged prior to this revolution continue to shape policy after it has 
occurred, and instead take full advantage of the positive social changes this 
democratization of longevity has bequeathed us.  
 6 Possible consequences of long-term low fertility. 
Long-term low fertility, along with continued decreases in mortality, raises the twin 
spectres of population decline and changes in the age structure of the population. The 
latter increases the support ratio of the number of people of economically active age 
(conventionally 15 - 64) compared to the ‘dependent’ elderly of 65+ years (although it 
reduces the support ratio for the dependent young). Both these consequences have 
often produced unduly alarmist reactions, both in contemporary political debate, and 
in the 1930s when the shift to lower fertility rates first became apparent (Spengler 
1926, Davis 1937, Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). However there are three important 
points to bear in mind. 
 
First, the bulk of population ageing has, in fact, already occurred. As shown in Figure 
4, the proportion of the population aged over 64 in Scotland roughly trebled across the 
twentieth century (from 5.4% in 1911 to 15.2% in 2000), and on current GAD 
projections, might double across the twenty-first. On Wilson and Rees’s most 
‘pessimistic’ scenario the over 64’s might represent 38.5% of Scotland’s population in 
2101. Raising fertility rates now, were that possible, would have much less impact on 
this process than Wilson and Rees’s discussion might lead us to expect. On their own 
figures a reduction of six percentage points in the population over 64 would be 
matched by a similar increase in the population under nineteen.  The main force 
driving changes in dependency ratios is the long-term impact of the demographic 
transition itself. This transition has reduced the proportion of young people (defined 
here as those under 15) in the Scottish population across the twentieth century from a 
third to a little over a sixth. As a result the overall support ratio (expressed as the ratio 
of those aged 15 to 64 to the rest of the population) has actually been improving 
slightly, as has the ratio of those in employment to all others (Figure 5).  
 
However, does it makes any sense to use age to calculate ‘dependency’. This may 
have had some logic when most workers were men, most entered the labour force at 
16, left it at 65 and worked full-time. It makes none at all when employment rates are 
driven by other factors. Working hours are continually dropping, so that increasing 
numbers of people enjoy shorter working weeks, longer and more frequent holidays 
and shorter careers. Workers stay in education longer, enter employment later and 
retire earlier: few remain active in their 60s (OECD 2004). Globalisation has not 
slowed this long-term trend. Women’s employment rates in Europe have almost 
doubled as a proportion of men’s over the last forty years (MacInnes 2006). Age 
structures capture none of these trends, which have been made possible by the same 
continuous increase in labour productivity that has driven up the value and 
opportunity cost of time. They also ignore what might be thought of as the social 
construction of age (Pérez Diaz 2003; Laslett 1991).  
 
Most ‘dependent’ over 64’s are in good health. The Rolling Stones may qualify for 
bus passes but this does not stop them touring. Their peers provide less visible but 
large and increasing amounts of time, resources and money to younger, employed, 
family members. Grandparents do more childcare. Increases in life expectancy have 
increased the proportion of dependent children with surviving grandparents and other 
older relatives who are healthy enough to take an active part in their care. The UK 
Millenium Cohort Study of babies born in 2000 (Centre for Longitudinal Studies 
2004) was undertaken when they were aged around nine months. Sixty per cent of 
these infants had all four grandparents alive when they were born. These grandparents 
were the single most important source of childcare after parents themselves. Two 
thirds of parents relied on them most for childcare outside of work hours, while one 
third used them as their main childcarers while they were at work2. Any trend decline 
in ‘real’ as opposed to age based support ratios, could surely easily covered by 
productivity increase. There is one qualification to bear in mind. Increased longevity 
may not be fully matched by increased health expectancy, so that a greater proportion 
of older people may require greater expenditure on health care. 
 
Finally, ‘population ageing’ is not really a concept but a (misleading) metaphor. 
Populations do not age, individuals do. Individuals die. Populations do so only when, 
species become extinct. It is empirically false to assert that a shift in the demographic 
weight of a population to older age categories is equivalent to the life course ageing of 
an individual. The phrase has a different origin. Rarely is the issue of supporting the 
growing volume of ageing dependents presented as a family issue, since people may 
see the longevity of their own parents or grandparents as a matter for celebration 
rather than concern. Rather the issue is framed in terms of the fiscal sustainability of 
the welfare state.  Since it is easy to imply that an increase in the proportion of the 
elderly must mean an increase in the volume of state support to this group, 
‘population ageing’ arguments are frequently used to imply that in the face of this 
new demographic challenge, the welfare state must cut its cloth to suit its shrinking 
capacities. However it may well be that the reverse is true. Increased life expectancy 
will create more complex issues of intergenerational transfers of resources. Only two 
institutions can undertake such transfer: the family and the state, and only the latter 
can do so in a way that does not increase social inequality.  
 
7 Scotland’s demographic problem: not enough old people? 
Like many demographic analyses that erroneously reduce reproduction to fertility, 
Wilson and Rees ignore mortality, even thought they assume its continued 
improvement in their projections (in my view correctly). However, surely most 
divergence of Scottish demography trends from the rest of Britain is due to the 
inability of some parts of Scotland to achieve what we might call ‘lowest low’ 
mortality typical of the rest of Europe. This brings us to another key theoretical 
problem in the approach of Wilson and Rees, and many other analyses of low fertility: 
which is to see ‘population ageing’ as a result, when it might just as well be theorised 
as the ultimate cause of low fertility. In Scotland, life expectancy at birth rose by 
twenty years in the first half of the last century, and another ten years in the second 
half. Until not much more than a century ago in much of Europe, women with an 
average life expectancy of around 35-40 years bearing four or five surviving children 
might devote half or more of their adult lives to intensive infant care. Now women 
face a life expectancy of 75-80 years, and if they bear two children might devote 
around 5% of their adult lives to such activity. These children in turn will themselves 
lead longer, more productive, and reproductive lives. Indeed it is too often forgotten 
that this is what the entire demographic transition has been about: a democratization 
of longevity widespread enough to permit population stability or growth net of 
migration with less than half the fertility rate typical of pre-transition societies. Such 
reproductive efficiency has not only fuelled economic growth by releasing resources 
for production, but by dramatically reducing the social impact of the biological 
division of labour in reproduction, created the conditions for greater sexual equality.  
 
Figure 6 shows that life expectancy at birth in Scotland is doing little to close the gap 
with England and Wales. Moreover, some areas of Scotland do far worse than the 
average. The standardized mortality ratio for Glasgow is one quarter higher than the 
average for Scotland (GROS 2004). Life expectancy for men and women in Scotland 
is some two years below that for England and Wales and around four years below 
some other countries in the European Union. Closing this gap (which would 
paradoxically ‘worsen’ population ageing) would significantly delay the onset of 
population decline.   
 
8 The choice between migration and fertility  
In common with many others, Wilson and Rees argue that while migration might 
influence the level of population, it has little effect on its age-structure, so that it is no 
substitute for natalism. Coleman (2002) uses the latest UN population estimates and 
projections to demonstrate that in order to preserve the present age structure of South 
Korea in the face of declining fertility, the entire population of the world would have 
to migrate there before the end of this century. However this argument does not 
follow, if, as we have suggested, there is no good reason to seek to preserve this, or 
any other, age structure of the population. Should fertility fall so low that employers 
faced a shortage of labour, there is no shortfall of potential migrants anxious to take 
them. 
 
However, the preference for fertility goes beyond demographers’ knowledge of age 
structures to more general beliefs about migration as such. While affluent, mostly 
white, citizens of developed Western countries virtually take for granted their ability 
to move elsewhere, they are often more circumspect about the right of ‘others’, 
especially those from poorer countries, or with black skins, to settle here. Here too 
there are insights from demographic theory as well as instructive parallels with the 
past. In its translation from biology to demography, the term ‘population’ undergoes a 
little noticed inflexion in meaning that changes the sense of the term profoundly when 
used in the plural. There is a global population, singular, of human beings, whose size 
depends on global births and deaths. Populations, plural, associated with 
administrative and political units (states, world regions, cities, local authority areas 
etc.) are the fruit of administrative artifice rather than demographic dynamics. 
Migration is the act of crossing an administrative frontier (and not infrequently its 
inverse, when people located in a particular space find themselves circumscribed by 
new or re-drawn boundaries).  
 
What is important is how these frontiers are socially constructed and represented. If 
we choose to imagine them as growing organically to circumscribe definable 
‘populations’, plural, comprising definable ‘peoples’ we are well on the road to a 
racialised vision of the world. Here is Karl Pearson, founder of world’s first statistics 
dept, admired by Einstein, socialist (he refused an OBE and Knighthood), feminist, 
Honorary Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and eugenicist: 
 
My view, and I think it may be called the scientific view, of a nation, is that of 
an organized whole, kept up to a high pitch of internal efficiency by insuring 
that its numbers are substantially recruited from the better stocks, and kept up 
to a high pitch of external efficiency by contest, chiefly by way of war with 
inferior races … No degenerate and feeble stock will ever be converted into 
healthy and sound stock by the accumulated effects of education, good laws, 
and sanitary surroundings. Such means may render the individual members of 
a stock passable if not strong members of society, but the same process will 
have to be gone through again and again with their offspring, and this in ever-
widening circles, if the stock, owing to the conditions in which society has 
placed it, is able to increase its numbers. (1919: 36-7, 1892: 26-7) 
 
Such an explicitly racist view of the world became less possible after the Holocaust. 
However it continues to underlie any approach that equates administratively 
constructed ‘populations’ with distinct peoples. To argue that the long term stability 
of the Scottish population is better based on fertility than migration is to fall, 
consciously or not, into the argument that the Scots, qua Scots, comprise a distinct 
‘people’, or ultimately ‘race’ whose numbers merit protection (despite their own 
reproductive choices) analogous to some endangered species. Logically, to erect too 
hard a distinction between migration and fertility returns to precisely those eugenic 
arguments deployed a century ago with reference to race. Few demographers would 
claim there to be any shortage of global population. Thus any justification of a natalist 
policy at sub-global level must rely upon the argument that the human race is 
composed of qualitatively different elements, whose ‘replacement’, regardless of 
global population trends, or the reproductive behaviour of that ‘people’ itself, is 
desirable. 
 
As well as a scientific question, fertility is a matter of popular rhetoric and public 
debate that tends to latch on to any alarmist imagery that, unfortunately, academics 
may sometimes employ without sufficient caution. This can be seen in newspaper 
headlines such as ‘Scots face birthrate ‘disaster’’ (Scotsman 14 September 2002); 
‘Scotland’s population crisis set to deepen’ (Scotsman 14 April 2004); ‘Pay up or die 
out’ (The Herald 6 April 2004); ‘Falling population threatens living standards’ 
(Sunday Herald 11 January 2004); ‘Scotland is emptying’ (Scotland on Sunday 4 
January 2004). The first political party to draw attention to the fertility regime in 
Scotland was, in fact, not the Scottish National Party, but the British National Party 
whose then Scottish organiser Peter Appelby penned a piece entitled ‘Scotland’s 
future is in our bedrooms’ which attributing Scotland’s falling birth rate to the rising 
cost of children. This is only what we might expect. Natalism has often been seen by 
ethnic nationalism, and more often than not by other nationalisms too, as its 
fundamental policy (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). It would be unfortunate if public 
debate about demography was distracted by unduly exaggerated claims about the 
imminence or importance of severe population decline, or the supposed malevolent 
effects of immigration.  
 
9 Is population size a legitimate policy goal? 
In a context where almost ten per cent of the current Scottish population was born 
elsewhere in the UK, and the equivalent of sixteen per cent were born in Scotland but 
now live in other parts, anything but the most general management of population 
trends will be difficult. Short of closing the border how could immigrants be required 
to settle in Scotland? However, this must lead us to demographic pessimism only if 
we believe that the population size of a state (or in Scotland’s case, constituent part of 
a state) is both a necessary and legitimate goal of government policy. Many 
commentators in the 1930s sought to link population expansion with economic 
growth, including Keynes (1937) in, of all places, the Eugenics Review. However any 
such link has never been clearly demonstrated and the economic and social impact of 
stable or slowly declining populations has not hitherto been the subject of much 
research. As Coleman (2002) reports, UK, Dutch and German government inquiries in 
the 1970s and 1980s failed to conclude that stable or slowly declining population 
levels constituted a serious problem. Wilson and Rees’s low fertility projections still 
leave Scotland with a population of some 3.5 million a century hence: hardly 
catastrophe or disaster, simply one aspect of social change that will inevitably be 
overwhelmed by others that we cannot yet even imagine. 
 
10 Conclusions 
It is important to remain conscious of the status of projections in demography. By this 
I do not mean that they are speculative or imprecise, although that is also true. I mean 
that they are a rhetorical device that seeks to invest our partial analysis of the present 
with the overarching authority of the future, rather like turns of phrase such ‘future 
generations will judge us by…’ or ‘historians will look back and say…’. No 
methodology provides such a crystal ball. The demographers of 1905 imagined the 
world of 2001 with as much insight as we possess about 2101. Other social changes 
will transform the significance of the population estimates we might make for such 
periods far more than any trend in population itself. This does not mean that 
population should not be an object of study and policy. We do need to plan for the 
future as well as the present. Migration needs to be properly managed. There is ample 
space for family policies that ensure that having children is straightforward for all 
who wish them, or health policies that do not leave older sub-fertile patients with a 
waiting list of self-defeating length for treatment. However we do little to facilitate 
such planning if we do not balance the creativity of our demographic imaginations 
with sober judgment. While the long-term future of fertility is a matter for 
speculation, on current trends it seems very unlikely to fall so far as to require 
problematically high rates of immigration to sustain Scotland’s population. Indeed, 
the years 2003 and 2004 saw rather significant increases in the number of births. 
Hospital delivery rooms are hardly empty. Scotland needs no pro-natalist policy. 
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Table 1  Live Births, Scotland 1946-2004.  
Year Births 
1946-50 101,222 
1951-55 91,366 
1956-60 98,663 
1961-65 102,642 
1966-70 93,033 
1971-75 75,541 
1976-80 65,758 
1981-85 66,422 
1986-90 65,544 
1991-95 63,571 
1994 61,656 
1995 60,051 
1996 59,296 
1997 59,440 
1998 57,319 
1999 55,147 
2000 53,076 
2001 52,527 
2002 51,270 
2003 52,432 
2004 53,957 
Source: General Register Office Scotland 
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Figure 3. Total Fertility Rate, selected countries 1960 - 2000 
 
Source: Council of Europe and US Dept. of Health 
 
Figure 4 Scotland: population aged > 64: 1911-2002 
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Figure 5 Scotland: support ratio and employment support ratio: 1911-2002 
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Figure 6 Life Expectancy at birth, Scotland and England and Wales, 1991-2004 
 
Source:  Life expectancy at birth by health and local authorities in the United Kingdom 1991-1993 to 
2002-2004. ONS 2005 
 
                                                
1 Author’s calculations from GHS 2003-4, respondents resident in Scotland. 
2 Author’s calculations from MCS first wave 
